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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: AT'ACHMENT BEFORE CRIMINAL
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS?
INTRODUCTION
The period from 1932 to 1967 witnessed an unprecedented expansion of the
scope of the constitutional right to counsel in the pretrial stages' of criminal
prosecutions. 2 This extension of the right to counsel followed two routes.
1. The question of when an accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel permeates both
judicial and nonjudicial pretrial events. In reference to the latter, the issue is whether, and when,
an individual who is the subject of a police investigation is entitled to have counsel present at
such common police procedures as interrogations and corporeal identifications. The realm of
judicial pretrial events is broader, encompassing arraignment, preliminary hearing, and other
similar hearings involving one who has already been arrested, as well as grand jury proceedings.
The issue of a putative defendant's right to counsel at a grand jury investigation, however, is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
There are several reasons why counsel is not needed in the grand jury room. First, grand jury
proceedings frequently occur after the preliminary hearing, a stage which requires the assistance
of counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). Generally, therefore, an accused is already
represented at the time of his grand jury appearance and no question is raised as to whether
counsel need be retained or appointed before the accused testifies. Second, the accused does not
stand alone in the grand jury room against the full organized force of the prosecutor or police;
rather, the constitutional guarantee of a grand jury indictment, U.S. Const. amend. V, provides a
buffer against oppressive government action. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571,
589-90 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). Third, counsel is allowed to be outside the grand jury
room and the putative defendant is permitted to consult with his attorney as often as he wishes
during questioning. See, e.g., United States v. George, 444 F.2d 310, 315 (6th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Capaldo, 402 F.2d 821, 824 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 989 (1969); United
States v. Isaacs, 347 F. Supp. 743, 759 (N.D. Ill. 1972) Hence, the issue with regard to grand
juries is not when the right to counsel attaches, but whether counsel has the right to be in the
grand jury room. It could be argued that counsel is needed in the grand jury room in order to
guarantee the effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself. Cf. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S.
1, 9 (1970) (preliminary hearing); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58-59 (1932) (sufficient period
before trial for investigation). However, given the fact that use of prior grand jury testimony at
the trial itself is limited to impeachment purposes, and that the testimony of another witness
cannot be used substantively unless the putative defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine
him fully, Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1), it seems that the absence of counsel in the grand jury room
would not affect the fairness of the trial.
Whether counsel is outside or inside the grand jury room also does not derogate from counsel's
function under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as guardian of the putative defendant's
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The witness is free to consult with his
attorney initially to determine whether an answer might incriminate him. If he raises the claim of
privilege, he has a right to counsel at a hearing on the issue. See United States v. Mandujano,
425 U.S. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring). Alternatively, the witness may be granted immunity,
in which case the privilege against self-incrimination is no longer involved. Id. at 574-75; see
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892). For a discussion of the effect of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to counsel on the
putative defendant called before the grand jury, see United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. at
584-609 (Brennan, J., concurring).
2. The line of Supreme Court cases extending the right to counsel in pretrial stages
commenced with Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), and ended with United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
First, in Miranda v. Arizona,3 the Supreme Court held that the assistance of
counsel at pretrial custodial interrogations was mandated under the fifth
amendment as a means of protecting the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination. 4 This right to counsel attaches as soon as "a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way."5 Second, the explicit sixth amendment right to counsel 6
attaches at the critical stage of a criminal prosecution, which, as broadly
defined by the Court in United States v. Wade,7 means at any stage at which
"potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres."18
The sixth amendment pretrial right to counsel, however, was severely
limited in 1972 when the Supreme Court, in Kirby v. Illinois,9 narrowed its
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda clarified Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), which
held that, once the investigation had "focused" on the accused, an interrogation conducted in the
absence of counsel was a violation of the right to counsel. Id. at 490-91; see Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. at 444 n.4. Although ostensibly decided under the sixth amendment, Escoobedo has been
viewed as guaranteeing the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. E.g., Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966); Eisen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under
Miranda v. Arizona, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 645, 665 (1967); Note, The Pretrial Right to Counsel,
26 Stan. L. Rev. 399, 402-03 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The Pretrial Right].
4. 384 U.S. at 444.
5. Id. (footnote omitted). The Court stated, however, that the defendant could make a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right. Id.
6. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. rl. The constitutional guarantee of
counsel was intended to overrule English common law. Originally, the right to counsel in
England was limited to misdemeanors and only one felony, treason. Even in those instances when
the accused was entitled to counsel, the attorney was permitted to advise only on "matters of
law," not on "matters of fact." See W. Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts 8-14
(1955).
A defendant may challenge an alleged violation of his sixth amendment right to counsel in a
number of ways. He may move for a new trial within seven days of the finding of guilt. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 33. Second, he may make a motion in arrest of judgment, asserting that the trial court
lost jurisdiction by denying the defendant a basic constitutional right. Fed. R. Crim. P. 34. If the
time for appeal has lapsed, the defendant may ask for a writ of comm nobis. This writ asks the
trial judge to correct judgment because of the discovery of material facts not known earlier.
United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439, 442-47 (1944) (Biggs, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). This is generally of little help, since the judge is aware of the facts surrounding the
absence of counsel. Fourth, the defendant may move to correct or set aside the sentence "upon
the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1976). This motion is a combination of traditional habeas corpus and coram nobis relief,
addressed to the trial court at any time after conviction. To limit its abuse, it must precede a
habeas corpus proceeding, the petitioner need not be at the hearing, and the motion need only be
heard once. Id. Of course, the defendant may file a direct appeal, but if that fails, the most
common means of collateral attack is the writ of habeas corpus, in which the defendant shows
how and why he is retained illegally. Id. §§ 2241-2242. The scope of review is limited to the trial
court's alleged lack of jurisdiction because of an unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful act. See
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466-68 (1938).
7. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
8. Id. at 227.
9. 406 U.S. 682 (1972). The Kirby decision was a plurality opinion, with four Justices
dissenting and Justice Powell writing a separate concurring opinion.
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broad definition of critical stage to those periods triggered by "the initiation of
adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment."10 As a result
of this decision, a defendant is entitled to counsel before the start of judicial
proceedings in only one situation- custodial interrogation." To justify this
result, the Kirby Court reasoned that in those pretrial stages to which a
constitutional right to counsel does not attach, the defendant is given ade-
quate protection by the due process provisions of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 
1 2
This Comment will submit that the accused needs the protection accorded
by the sixth amendment right to counsel in pre-judicial stages. Part I of this
Comment will trace the development of the "critical stage" standard of the
sixth amendment. As Part II will demonstrate, the due process safeguards
relied on by the Kirby Court have not adequately protected the defendant's
rights. Part III will contend that since counsel protects substantially similar
interests under the fifth and sixth amendments, the sixth amendment right to
counsel should attach as early as the right to counsel does under the fifth
amendment.
I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT'S APPLICABILITY AND
"CRITICAL STAGE" STANDARD
A. Pre-Kirby Attachment
The importance of the sixth amendment right to counsel is reflected in the
breadth of its scope.' 3 It applies to defendants in all federal prosecutions
14
10. Id. at 689.
11. Formal charge is not the same as arrest. A suspe-ct can be arrested if there is probable
cause, U.S. Const. amend. IV; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1959), but he will
generally not be formally charged by means of indictment or information in the absence of a
stronger showing. Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-73 (1949) (proof required to
prove guilt greater than that required to show probable cause).
12. 406 U.S. at 690-91. For a discussion of the due process protections envisioned by the
Court, see notes 75-82 infra and accompanying text.
13. The right to the assistance of counsel, which has been characterized as the "most
pervasive" of a defendant's rights, Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 8 (1956); see Douglas, The Right to Counsel-A Forward, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 693, 693
(1961), has traditionally been accorded legislative and constitutional protection. Congress guaran-
teed a statutory right to counsel in the first federal criminal code, Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9,
§ 29, 1 Stat. 112 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1976)). Less than one year later, the right
was given constitutional stature when the sixth amendment, which had been adopted by
Congress without debate in 1789, was ratified by the states. D. Fellman, The Defendant's Rights
Today 210 (1976). Moreover, 49 states have recognized the importance of the right by adopting a
constitutional provision guaranteeing defendants legal representation in criminal prosecutions. Of
these, seven states adopt the wording of the federal constitation. Alaska Const. art. 1, § 11; Iowa
Const. art. 1, § 10; Mich. Const. art. 1, § 20; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 6; N.J. Const. art. 1, 10;
R.I. Const. art. 1, § 10; W. Va. Const. art. 3, § 14. The constitutions of 19 states declare that an
accused has the right to be heard by himself, by counsel, or by both. Ala. Const. art. 1, § 6; Ark.
Const. art. 2, § 10; Conn. Const. art. 1, § 8; Del. Const. art. 1, § 7; Fla. Const. art. 1, § 16; Ind.
Const. art. 1, § 13; Ky. Const. § 11; Me. Const. art. 1, § 6; Mass. Const. § 13; Miss. Const. art.
3, § 26; N.H. Const. pt. 1, art. 15; Okla. Const. art. 2, § 20; Or. Const. art. 1, § 11; Pa. Const.
art. 1, § 9; S.C. Const. art. 1, § 14; Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 9; Tex. Const. art. 1, § 10; Vt. Const.
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and, by means of the fourteenth amendment, to defendants in all state
prosecutions. s The exercise of this right does not depend on the nature or
severity of the offense; no criminal defendant may be imprisoned for any
offense-capital or noncapital, felony, misdemeanor or petty-unless he has
been represented by counsel.' 6 Likewise, a defendant's ability to afford an
ch. 1, art. 10; Wis. Const. art. 1, § 7. Eighteen states provide the accused with the right to
appear and defend himself in person, by counsel, or by both. Ariz. Const. art. 2. § 24; Cal.
Const. art. 1, § 15; Colo. Const. art. 2, § 16; Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13; hi. Const. art. 1, § 8;
Kan. Const. Bill of Rts., § 10; Mo. Const. art. 1, § 18(a); Mont. Const. art. 2, § 24; Neb. Const.
art. 1, § 11; Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8; N.M. Const. art. 2, § 14; N.Y. Const. art. 1, § 6; N.D.
Const. art. 1, § 13; Ohio Const. art. 1, § 10; S.D. Const. art. 6, § 7; Utah Coast. art. 1, § 12;
Wash. Const. art. 1, § 22; Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10. The provisions of five states are uniquely
worded. Ga. Const. art. 1, § 2-111 (a defendant is to have the privilege and benefit of counsel);
Hawaii Const. art. 1, § 11 (right to the assistance of counsel and, if the accused is indigent, the
appointment of counsel); La. Const. art. 1, § 13 (same); Md. Const. Decl. of Rts., art. 21 (an
accused is to be allowed counsel); N.C. Const. art. 1, § 23 (the accused has the right to counsel),
Virginia, the one state without a constitutional provision, protects the right to counsel by statute,
Va. Code §§ 19.2-157 to -163 (1975 & Supp. 1978), and by judicial interpretation. See Whitley v.
Cunningham, 205 Va. 251, 252, 135 S.E.2d 823, 825 (1964); Barnes v. Commonwealth, 92 Va.
794, 803, 23 S.E. 784, 787 (1895).
14. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938), declared that the sixth amendment
encompassed the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants in federal felony prosecutions,
capital and non-capital, as well as the unqualified right to retained counsel. An indigent
defendant's right to appointed counsel in federal courts is also guaranteed by statute. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 44.
15. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963). Gideon overruled the "special circum-
stances" test of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), a pure due process analysis which required
the Supreme Court to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the absence of
counsel resulted in a trial which was fundamentally unfair. Betts comported with the belief held
by most states that the presence or absence of counsel was a matter of state criminal procedure
and did not rise to the level of a constitutionally protected right. Even though all but one state
had a constitutional provision regarding the right to counsel, see note 13 supra, less than half of
these states required counsel to be appointed in all cases when the defendant was indigent. In
some of these, the appointment was at the discretion of the trial judge. The rest appointed
counsel only on request, or only for capital crimes and felonies. See W. Beaney, supra note 6, at
238 app. I. In the years between Belts and Gideon, the Court almost always found "special
circumstances" and a consequent denial of the right to counsel and due process. E.g., Carniey v-
Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962); Hudson v. North
Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960). See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 349 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
16. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). The accused may make a "knowing and
inteligent waiver" of this right, id. at 37, but this waiver is not presumed. An affirmative act of
the accused accompanied by a demonstrated understanding of the disadvantages of defending
without counsel would constitute such a waiver. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938);
see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977). Argersinger also raises a number of issues
beyond the scope of this Comment, such as the possibility that counsel is essential when a
deprivation of property, rather than a deprivation of liberty, is the criminal penalty. See generally
Center for Criminal Justice, Boston University Law School, The Right to Counsel in Criminal
Cases: The Mandate of Argersinger v. Hardin 5- 11 (National Institute of Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice 1976) [hereinafter cited as Mandate]. The Supreme Court, however, recently
limited the Argersinger right to counsel to situations actually resulting in imprisonment. Scott v.
Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979).
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attorney is immaterial. If indigent, a defendant must be provided with
court-appointed counsel.' 7
The question of when the right attaches, however, has been the subject of
considerable debate. Although the sixth amendment is silent on the issue,18
the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama 9 established that a defendant is
entitled to the assistance of counsel at the critical stage of a criminal
prosecution. In Powell, seven indigent black defendants were charged and
later convicted of the rape of two white women. The defendants were not
provided with counsel until immediately preceding the commencement of
trial. 20 The Court held that the sixth amendment was violated because
appointing counsel only for the trial itself denied the defendants the assistance
of counsel in any meaningful sense. 2' The Court reasoned that the assistance
of counsel is vitally important at any critical pretrial period for the purposes
of consultation, investigation, and preparation for trial. 22 In words that
would resurface in most subsequent right to counsel cases, the majority noted:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small
and sometimes no skill in the science of law .... He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. . . . He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If
that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and
illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. 23
The Powell Court established the critical stage standard for determining when
the right to counsel attached, but provided little guidance as to what
constituted a critical stage. The Court merely stated that the accused was
entitled to the assistance of counsel commencing at a point before trial
17. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
18. The sixth amendment refers to "criminal prosecutions" without further defining the term.
19. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
20. Id. at 53-54.
21. Id. at 69. The Court adopted the rationale of two early state cases which interpreted state
constitutional provisions similar to the sixth amendment right to mandate in spirit, if not In letter,
that the accused who is appointed counsel enjoy all benefits that flow from retaining counsel for
his defense. Id. at 57 (citing Batchelor v. State, 189 Inl. 69, 125 N.E. 773 (1920); Burgess v.
Risley, 66 How. Pr. 67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1883)). In Burgess, the court stated: "Perhaps the literal
letter of the constitutional provision would be complied with by allowing... counsel [at] 'trial,'
but such a construction would illustrate the truth of . . [the] maxim ... : 'The letter killeth,' and
disregard its conclusion, 'while the spirit giveth life.' . . Where a right is conferred by law,
everything necessary for its protection is also conferred.... [T]his must include... counsel prior
to the trial." 66 How. Pr. at 68-69.
22. 287 U.S. at 57. The Court stated that the aid of counsel in a capital offense is of
"fundamental character." Id. at 68.
23. Id. at 68-69. In addition, the majority opinion rejected the argument that the trial judge
could act as counsel for defendant. The Court reasoned that a judge can ensure only that the
defendant is treated fairly, he can neither investigate for the defendant nor "participate in those
necessary conferences between counsel and accused which sometimes partake of the inviolable
character of the confessional." Id. at 61.
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sufficient to allow adequate preparation. 24 Although this critical stage stan-
dard was widely followed after Powel, 2S it was not until the 1967 decision in
United States v. Wade26 that the Court clearly defined "critical stage" as any
stage where "potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres.""27
In Wade, defendant was indicted on a federal bank robbery charge,
arrested, and subsequently provided with court-appointed counsel. 28 Thereaf-
ter, an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation arranged for a lineup 29 to
be held in the absence of counsel. At the lineup, two eyewitnesses to the
robbery identified the defendant.3 0 At trial, both eyewitnesses made an
in-court identification of the defendant and testified as to their prior lineup
identification on cross-examination. The defendant was convicted, in large
part because of the identification testimony.
3
'
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the pretrial lineup was a critical
stage of the prosecution and that, therefore, the defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel had been violated. 3 2 The Court reasoned that because the
24. Id. at 71.
25. See, e.g., White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (certain preliminary hearings); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (first appeal as matter of right); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (trial); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (arraignments where rights must
be asserted or lost). The use of "critical stage" as the functional criterion went furthest when the
Supreme Court developed the accusatory-focus rationale of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964), discussed at note 3 supra. The Court held that when an investigation was no longer a
general inquiry but had focused on the accused, a pre-indictment interrogation of the accused was
critical to him. Therefore, such an interrogation conducted in the absence of an attorney %as a
violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. at 490-91.
26. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
27. Id. at 227. The Court used this definition in Wade, a federal prosecution, and in its
companion cases of Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967), both of which were state prosecutions.
28. The Court attached little importance to the fact that Wade was already represented at the
time of the lineup. This is evidenced by the Court's decision in a companion case, Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), in which the police staged a showup without giving the accused time
to hire an attorney. The Court did not distinguish Stovall from Wade on this ground
29. Corporeal identification procedures can be divided into two types: lineups and showups.
In a lineup, the witness views the accused in addition to a number of other suspects. In a
showup, the accused is the only suspect the witness sees. P. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in
Criminal Cases 27-28, 40-41 (1965); Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades (pL i),
1963 Crim. L. Rev. 479. The latter is by its nature suggestive and hence disfavored. Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
30. 388 U.S. at 234. All the participants in the lineup wore tape on their face, as had the
robber, and all spoke the words allegedly spoken by him. Id. at 220.
31. At the dose of testimony, defendant's attorney unsuccessfully moved to strike the witness'
in-court identification on the grounds that the lineup, held without notice to and in the absence of
counsel, was in violation of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth
amendment right to counsel. Id. Testimony about the pretrial identification itself mas not in
issue.
32. Id. at 224-25. The Court first dispensed with the fifth amendment claim, holding that the
privilege against self-incrimination only pertains to evidence of a testimonial or communicative
nature. The majority held that being compelled to participate in a lineup, and even to speak, did
not amount to giving evidence against one's self; using the accused's voice as an identifying
physical characteristic did not require the accused to speak his guilt. Id. at 221-23. The Court
similarly rejected the fifth amendment claim asserted in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
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identification procedure was virtually impossible to reconstruct later, 33 not
(1966), where a blood sample was taken from defendant against his wishes after he was arrested
for drunk driving. The Schmerber Court held that the pdvilege against self-incrimination is not
violated by compelling submission to "fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write
or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a
particular gesture." Id. at 764 (footnote omitted).
Although the Wade Court upheld the defendant's right to counsel at the lineup, it also
recognized the importance of an in-court identification to the prosecution's case. The Court
framed the remedy for use of an in-court identification based on a pretrial confrontation held
without counsel narrowly: the in-court identification would be excluded only if there was no
independent basis for it. 388 U.S. at 240. Whether an independent basis existed for the in-court
identification could be determined at a hearing outside the presence of the jury at which the trial
court would consider:. (1) the conduct of the confrontation. (2) how well and how long the witness
observed the suspect during the crime; (3) the witness' opportunity to observe the crime itself; (4)
the differences, if any, between the witness' prelineup description of the suspect and the suspect's
actual appearance; (5) whether the witness had previously identified the suspect from a photo-
graphic array; (6) whether the witness failed to identify the suspect at an earlier opportunity; (7)
whether the witness had already identified someone else; (8) the amount of time between the
crime and the confrontation; and (9) how well the witness knew the suspect. Id. at 241.
In contrast, when dealing with testimony about the tainted identification itself, the Court held
that only a per se exclusionary rule would suffice. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967).
In that case, the witnesses made an in-court identification of the defendant and also testified
about the identification they had made at a lineup held without defendant's counsel. See Gilbert
v. United States, 366 F.2d 923, 956 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 985 (1968). The Gilbert
Court held that Wade's test was applicable to the states and that any in-court identification made
during a state trial, based on a tainted pretrial identification procedure, must therefore meet the
independent basis test. 388 U.S. at 272. Moreover, the Court found the testimony about the
lineup itself to be the direct result of the illegal conduct and therefore ruled that the prosecution
would not be entitled to show an independent basis for this earlier identification. Id. at 272-73
(citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (evidence derived "by exploitation of
[the primary] illegality" must be excluded)).
Testimony about the witness' prior identification serves. two purposes: (1) to bolster, corrobo-
rate, or serve as independent evidence of the witness' in-court identification and testimony, In
some cases, even if the witness' testimony remains unimpeached; and (2) to use in place of a
courtroom identification when, for example, the defendant's appearance has substantially
changed since the time of the crime or pretrial identification, rendering an in-court identification
impossible. See, e.g., People v. Gould, 54 Cal.2d 621, 626, 354 P.2d 865, 867, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273,
275 (1960); Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(IXC); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 60.25, .30 (McKinney 1975),
The dangers of this testimony, however, are paramount. First, a jury is generally more impressed
by a pretrial identification since it has greater probative value than an in-court identification,
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. at 273-74; People v. Gould, 54 Cal.2d at 626, 354 P.2d at 867, 7
Cal. Rptr. at 275. Second, unless counsel was present at the initial lineup, there would be no
effective way to elicit any doubt the witness may have then entertained, United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. at 230, because a witness rarely changes his mind after making an identification. id. at
229; see Williams & Hammelmann, supra note 29, at 482. Hence, the Gilbert majority found that
only a strict per se exclusionary rule would be an effective deterrent against law enforcement
authorities who persisted in denying the accused his right to the assistance of counsel at the
"critical lineup." 388 U.S. at 273.
33. 388 U.S. at 229-30. The Court recognized that a secret procedure resulted in " 'a gap in
our knowledge' " and hence prevented accurate reconstruction at trial. Id. at 230 (quoting
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966)). Neither witnesses nor participants are trained to
recognize or remember suggestive influences. Besides, the defense can rarely rely on participants
to testify at trial since their names are seldom available. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 230.
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having counsel present at that point denied the accused the effective assis-
tance of counsel at the trial itself. 34 Furthermore, the inherent suggestiveness
and untrustworthiness of corporeal identification procedures render the result-
ing identification suspect. 35 Hence, the corporeal identification is critical to
the accused because his trial and determination of his guilt
may well not be that in the courtroom but that at the pretrial confrontation, with the
state aligned against the accused, the witness the sole jury, and the accused unpro-
tected against [any] overreaching, intentional or unintentional, and with little or no
effective appeal from the judgment there rendered by the witness--"that's the man."136
Applying the definition of critical stage established in Ti ade, it would
appear that a defendant is entitled to counsel at pre-indictment corporeal
identifications as well as at post-indictment ones. 3 7 The Wade Court focused
on the potential for substantial prejudice in a particular procedure and not on
the point at which the proceeding occurred. 38 The potential for substantial
In addition, the accused, under tension, will rarely be cognizant of prejudicial practices. See
Williams & Hammelmann, supra note 29, at 482.
34. 388 U.S. at 224, 230-32. See generally Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938);
Schaefer, supra note 13, at 8.
35. 388 U.S. at 235; see F. Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti 30 (1927); P. Wall,
supra note 29, at 26-27; Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades (pts. 1-2), 1963 Crim.
L. Rev. 479, 479-90, 545, 545-55.
36. 388 U.S. at 235-36.
37. There are several limitations and exceptions to the Wade rules. First, a suspect can
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel at the pretrial corporeal identification.
Taylor v. Swenson, 458 F.2d 593, 596-97 (8th Cir. 1972); see note 16 supra. Second, the right to
counsel will be suspended if time or circumstances render the presence of counsel impractical, if
not impossible. The most common examples of exigent circumstances are accidental confronta-
tions, see, e.g., United States v. Famulari, 447 F.2d 1377, 1380-82 (2d Cir. 1971); Common-
wealth v. D'Ambra, 357 Mass. 260, 263, 258 N.E.2d 74, 76 (1970), on-the-scene confrontations
occurring shortly after the commission of a crime, see, e.g., United States ex rel. Cummings v.
Zelker, 455 F.2d 714, 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 927 (1972); United States v. Perry, 449
F.2d 1026, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1971); State v. Salcido, 10 Ariz. 380, 382, 509 P.2d 1027, 1029
(1973), and the witness' poor state of health. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302
(1967).
Furthermore, Congress has attempted to limit the Wade rules with Title H of the Omnibus Safe
Streets & Crime Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3502 (1976), which allows the admission of
in-court identification testimony whether or not it has an independent basis. The Supreme Court,
however, has eschewed the Act in later cases interpreting Wade. This fact underscores the view
of many commentators that the Act is an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to overrule what
the Supreme Court has held to be a constitutionally required rule. Read, Lawyers at Lineups:
Constitutional Necessity or Avoidable Extravagance?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 339, 359-61 (1969);
The Pretrial Right, supra note 3, at 406-07 n.38. See generally N. Sobel, Eve-Witness Identifica-
tion: Legal and Practical Problems 18-41 (1972).
38. 388 U.S. at 227; see notes 27, 32-36 supra and accompanying text. The Wade Court
observed that precedent mandated scrutinizing any pretrial confrontation to determine whether
there was a violation of the accused's constitutional rights. 388 U.S. at 227. The Court reasoned
that the principle established in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), that there was a right to counsel at interrogations once the suspect
was in police custody, even if before indictment, was equally applicable to the corporeal
identification situation. "It is central to that principle that ... the accused is guaranteed that he
need not stand alone ... at any stage ... formal or informal, in court or out , " 388 U.S. at
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prejudice is just as great in a pre-indictment confrontation as it is in a
post-indictment one. 39 In light of the realities of modern investigatory proce-
dures, 40 pre-indictment confrontations of the accused often result in identifica-
tions or other information which then and there determine the accused's guilt
or innocence for all practical purposes and render the trial itself a mere
formality to seal the accused's fate.4 1
The contention that pre-indictment confrontations fall within the critical
stage standard is further supported by the Court's decision in a companion
case to Wade, Stovall v. Denno.42 In that case, before he was indicted or
arraigned, the defendant was brought to the victim's hospital room for a
showup. 43 The defendant was not given the opportunity to obtain counsel.
44
226 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). It is noteworthy that the majority in Wade saw no
reason to correct or limit the dissent's statement to the effect that the majority holding applied to
any confrontation, whether staged before or after indictment. Id. at 251 (White, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part).
39. This potential prejudice is underscored by the many instances of abuse at both the
pre-indictment and post-indictment stage. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 232-33 nn.17-23.
Consistent with this observation, most state courts and all federal circuit courts ruling on the
issue subsequent to Wade but before Kirby applied the sixth amendment right to counsel to all
corporeal identifications. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 704 n.14 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Note, The State Responses to Kirby v. United States [sic], 1975 Wash. U. L.Q. 423, 431
n.46, 436-37 nn.74-75. They reasoned that any other interpretation would exalt form over
substance. E.g., Wilson v. Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142, 144 (10th Cir. 1972) (there can be no
constitutional distinction as to critical status based upon formal charge), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
854 (1972). One court noted that if the return of an indictment was controlling on the issue, it
would "only lead to a situation wherein substantially all lineups would be conducted prior to
indictment or information" in order to escape the consttutional mandate. People v. Fowler, 1
Cal.3d 335, 344, 461 P.2d 643, 650, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 370 (1969).
40. The Wade Court noted that today, in contrast to the late eighteenth century when the Bill
of Rights was adopted, most of the investigation, marshalling of evidence, and confrontations
between an accused and a witness occur well before trial. 388 U.S. at 224-25.
41. The Wade Court indicated that legislative innovations which would correct defects in the
identification procedure, thereby eliminating potential prejudice to the accused, might suffice to
remove pretrial corporeal identifications from the critical class. Id. at 239. For examples of
proposed model statutes, see J. Wigmore, The Science of Judicial Proof 540-42 (3d ed. 1937) and
Murray, The Criminal Lineup at Home and Abroad, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 610, 627-28. The
Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia has attempted to institute an
objective lineup procedure. The procedure requires the presence of counsel and the participation
of eight to twelve individuals who are physically similar to the suspect. The attorney is given tile
opportunity to regroup the participants. Moreover, the identification is videotaped with sound for
later use at trial, so that reconstruction and cross-examination are possible and any doubt on the
part of the identifying witness, or any question of suggestiveness, can be discerned by the jury. B.
Forst, J. Lucianovic, & S. Cox, What Happens After Arrest? 80 (Institute for Law & Social
Research, PROMIS Research Project No. 4 1977).
42. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
43. For a discussion of the distinction between showups and lineups, see note 29 supra.
Defendant in Stovall was arrested for the murder of a doctor and the stabbing of the doctor's
wife. Defendant was handcuffed to one of five accompanying policemen and brought to the wife's
hospital room. The defendant, the only black in the room, was identified after the wife was asked
if he was the assailant. At trial, the victim testified about the hospital room identification and
made an in-court identification. 388 U.S. at 295.
44. 388 U.S. at 295.
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The Court, based on its rationale in Wade, found the procedure to be
potentially prejudicial to the defendant.4 s The Court, however, held that the
Wade rule was not to apply retroactively. 4 6 Had the Court ruled otherwise,
the Wade rule would have been applied to this pre-indictment showup. The
Court emphasized that it was not minimizing the importance of the rights set
forth in Wade by making their application prospective only, but was instead
recognizing that, before the date of the decision, law enforcement authorities
were not warned that evidence derived from a confrontation held in the
absence of counsel would not be admissible in court. 47 It ruled that, in place
of the Wade rules, a due process test should be used for pre-Wade situa-
tions.48
The Wade critical stage standard also requires the assistance of counsel at
or after indictment or the filing of an information. 49 The critical stage
standard also encompasses arraignments because a procedural error at that
proceeding "may affect the whole trial."510 Similarly, defendants are entitled to
representation by counsel at preliminary hearings.5s At a preliminary hearing,
which is trial-like in form, a lawyer's cross-examination may expose fatal
flaws in the state's case and thereby possibly prevent the defendant from
being bound over for trial.5 2 Even if the defendant is bound over, the lawyer
can prevent prejudice to the defendant by using his cross-examination at the
preliminary hearing to impeach state witnesses at the subsequent trial, or, at
the very least, to preserve any favorable preliminary hearing testimony given
by a witness who for some reason does not testify at trial.5 3 Finally, the right
to counsel has also been extended to post-conviction events such as sentenc-
ing5 4 and first appeal as of right.5 5
The Wade standard, however, does not call for the assistance of counsel at
scientific investigations and photographic identifications. 5 6 Scientific investi-
45. Id. at 294, 298-99.
46. Id. at 296-97.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 301-02. Under this test, due process is violated if the procedure is "unnecessarily
suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification." Id. at 302; see notes 75-82 infra
and accompanying text. No due process violation was found in Stovall because the identifying
witness' poor health justified the use of a showup. 388 U.S. at 302; see note 37 supra.
49. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 226 (1977); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977);
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06
(1964).
50. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961); see Walton v. Arkansas, 371 U.S. 28
(1962) (per curiam). Hamilton applied the right to counsel only to arraignments at which certain
rights must be asserted or lost. 368 U.S. at 54. In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972), the
Court indicated that the right to counsel attaches at all arraignments.
51. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7-10
(1970).
52. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
53. Id.
54. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
55. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). No right to counsel exists for discretionary
appeals. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
56. Although there may be no constitutional right to retained or appointed counsel in certain
situations, the accused is not left entirely without protection. Many states have provided by
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gations, which include the taking and examining of handwriting exemplars,
fingerprints, and blood samples, 57 are not critical because "there is minimal
risk that the absence of counsel might derogate from [the defendant's] right to
a fair trial."' ' 8 These tests utilize established scientific procedures with few
variations in technique and can be effectively reconstructed and contradicted
at trial by the defendant's expert witnesses.5 9 In addition, the possibility of
suggestiveness is significantly lessened in scientific investigations because in
those tests, unlike corporeal identifications, the human element is absent. 60
Similarly, photographic identifications do not require the assistance of counsel
because the defendant is not present and it is easy to reconstruct the events at
trial. 6 1
statute that an accused is entitled to communicate immediately after arrest with his own attorney
or family. These statutes make it an offense for police to refuse such a request. See, e.g., Cal.
Penal Code § 851.5 (West Supp. 1979); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 103-3, -8 (Smith-Hurd 1970). For
a comprehensive discussion of these statutes, see E. Fisher, Disposition of Prisoner Following
Arrest § 7 (rev. ed. 1971).
57. See, e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting exemplars); Woods v.
United States, 397 F.2d 156, 156 (9th Cir. 1968) (fingerprinting); Sandoval v. State, 172 Colo.
383, 389, 473 P.2d 722, 725 (1970) (taking photographs of the accused); State v. Hughes, 244 La.
774, 783, 154 So.2d 395, 399 (1963) (physical examination and measurement of the accused).
Moreover, these procedures do not invoke the right to counsel which accompanies the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The privilege does not reach "compulsion which
makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence.' " Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). But see 388 U.S. at 277 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting In
part); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 243 (Black, J., concurring); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. at 773 (Black, J., dissenting). See generally Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 264-66
(1967).
58. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967).
59. Id.; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227-28. If the defendant believes the test is
deficient, he can take new samples or have the old samples analyzed by defense experts. Gilbert
v. California, 388 U.S. at 267.
60. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228.
61. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317-19 (1973). "[Tjhere are substantially fewer
possibilities of impermissible suggestion when photographs are used, and those unfair influences
can be readily reconstructed at trial." Id. at 324 (Stewart, J., concurring). The defendant,
however, can make a due process claim on the ground that the identification is unreliable
because of the suggestiveness of the photographic array. Compare Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 301-02 (1967) with Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 382-86 (1968). See generally
United States v. Crawford, 576 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
Many police departments are striving to use more objective photographic arrays. In the District
of Columbia, for example, photographic identifications precede the lineup. Only one police officer
is present, and the witness changes the slides at his own speed, The files include pictures of every
person ever arrested by the Metropolitan Police Department. B. Forst, J. Lucianovic & S. Cox,
supra note 41, at 79-80, 86 n.22. Despite the use of objective arrays, the human element cannot
be reconstructed later. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. at 332-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Commentators, in evaluating identification methods, have consistently favored lineups over
showups, and both over photographic identifications. See, e.g., ALI Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure §§ 160.1, .2 (1975); P. Wall, supra note 29, at 70-71; Sobel, Assailing the
Impermissible Suggestion: Evolving Limitations on the Abuse of Pre-trial Criminal Identification
Methods, 38 Brooklyn L. Rev. 261, 264, 296 (1971); Comment, Photographic Identification: The
Hidden Persuader, 56 Iowa L. Rev. 408, 410-11, 419 (1970). See also Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). After examining the most objective photographic identification
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B. Attachment Under Kirby
Nearly five years after the Wade decision, the Supreme Court, in Kirby v.
Illinois,62 redefined critical stage to cover only those procedures occurring at
or after the commencement of adversary judicial proceedings, by way of
formal charge, arraignment, preliminary hearing, indictment, or informa-
tion. 63 In that case, defendant Kirby, who had not been informed of his right
to counsel, was brought to the police station and identified in a showup by a
robbery victim.6 Kirby was not indicted and counsel was not appointed until
six weeks after the showup. 6- At trial, evidence of the victim's stationhouse
identification and an in-court identification were admitted over the defen-
dant's objections that his right to counsel had been denied, and defendant was
convicted. 6 6
In affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court reasoned that a "criminal
prosecution," to which the sixth amendment right to counsel is explicitly
limited, commences only with the initiation of adversary judicial proceed-
ings. 67 The Court concluded that it was only at the point of formal charge
that the state committed itself to prosecute the defendant. 68 The majority
observed that its decision was consistent with precedent since all previous
cases in which the Court upheld the sixth amendment right to counsel
involved post-formal charge events. 69 Furthermore, the Court justified its
procedures, one study concluded: "Many instances may exist in which the offender %as ap-
prehended only as a result of an accurate photographic identification. . . Many other instances
may exist in which the witness was quite sure of an accurate identification, yet in fact mistaken.
[l-t will often be the case that a picture . .. will resemble the offender, yet not be that person.
Subsequent identification of the pictured person at a lineup might reflect only that the witness
remembered and identified the person who was in the picture, not the person who committed the
offense." B. Forst, J. Lucianovic & S. Cox, supra note 41, at 80.
62. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
63. Id. at 689. The accused, therefore, is left unprotected from the time of arrest until he is
formally charged. Permitting this uncounseled period encourages police to delay indictment or
rush confrontations. See People v. Fowler, 1 Cal.3d 335, 344, 461 P.2d 643, 650, 82 Cal. Rptr.
363, 370 (1969); College of Law, Arizona State Univ. & Police Foundation, Model Rules for Law
Enforcement-Eyewitness Identification R. 402 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Model Rules).
64. 406 U.S. at 684-85. No effort was made to organize a lineup. Instead, a showup was
conducted with the suspects seated at a table with two police officers. Id. at 691-92 (Brennan J.,
dissenting).
65. Id. at 685.
66. Id. at 685-86.
67. Id. at 689-90. The Court reasoned that a confrontation that took place six weeks before
indictment "took place long before the commencement of any prosecution" to which the sixth
amendment guarantees are applicable. Id. at 690. But cf. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307
(1971) (sixth amendment speedy trial guarantee in "criminal prosecution" attaches at arrest).
68. 406 U.S. at 689.
69. Id. at 688-89. This justification, however, overlooks two cases decided after Wade, which
dealt with pre-Wade confrontations occurring before the commencement of judicial criminal
proceedings. In these cases, the Court applied the Stovall due process test without giving any
indication that the Wade rules were inapplicable because the confrontations occurred before
formal charge. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440
(1969).
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holding by stating that a defendant in a pre-formal charge procedure, though
without counsel, would be adequately protected by due process safeguards.70
Under the standard established in Kirby, a criminal suspect, deprived of his
bodily freedom, has no right to the assistance of counsel for his defense in any
situation, with the exception of fifth amendment protection in custodial
interrogations, 7 1 which occurs before formal charge. In most cases, the
defendant's right to counsel remains the same as it was under Wade. Thus,
indictments, informations, arraignments, preliminary hearings, and post-
conviction events would still constitute critical stages, while photographic
identifications and scientific investigations would not.72 On the other hand, a
different result would occur in corporeal identifications held before the
initiation of "adversary judicial proceedings." No right to counsel would
attach since the identification occurs before formal charges have been filed
against the defendant.7 3 Such a standard ignores the fact that a corporeal
identification can be just as critical to a criminal suspect who is not yet
formally charged as it can be to a defendant who is charged before the
confrontation. 7 4
70. 406 U.S. at 690-91. The Court adopted the Stovall due process test to protect the accused
from prejudicial procedures. Due process "forbids a lineup that is unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification." Id. at 691 (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 302 (1967)). Defendant subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging a denial of due
process. The Seventh Circuit denied the application, reasoning that the identification testimony
was reliable. United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1016 (1975).
71. The Kirby limitation applied only to the critical stage test of the sixth amendment and did
not affect the holding of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. at
688.
72. See notes 56-61 supra and accompanying text.
73. A substantial majority of state courts have followed Kirby's critical stage definition. Note,
The State Responses to Kirby v. United States [sic], 1975 Wash. U. L.Q. 423, 436-41. The
highest state court of only one state has rejected Kirby. People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 338,
217 N.W.2d 22, 27 (1974). Nevertheless, some state courts have recently indicated the need for a
more flexible standard in defining the commencement of "adversary proceedings" at earlier points
in time. For example, one state court purporting to follow Kirby has ruled that counsel should be
appointed at arrest. Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 171, 320 A.2d 351, 353 (1974).
Another court has held that the issuance of an arrest warrant initiates adversary proceedings,
Arnold v. State, 484 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Mo. 1972), and still others have held that the right to
counsel attaches with "the filing of an instrument other than one forming the basis of an
arraignment or. . . arrest warrant." People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 225, 371 N.E.2d 819,
821, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59 (1977). By interpreting critical stage more flexibly than Kirby, these
state courts seemingly recognize that only counsel, and not due process, can adequately prevent
prejudice to an accused's rights.
74. Indeed, some commentators view confrontations occurring before judicial criminal pro-
ceedings as more critical than those occurring after. They reason that in the latter the police have
already garnered sufficient evidence to convict the accused and that, therefore, admission of
evidence of a suggestive confrontation at trial might be harmless error. In the former case, the
result of the confrontation may determine whether the government will prosecute. N. Sobel,
supra note 37, at 11-12; see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 699 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wilson v.
Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142, 144 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972).
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II. THE INADEQUACIES OF Kirby
In Kirby, the Court stated that the due process safeguards enunciated in
Stovall would be an adequate substitute for counsel in procedures occurring
before formal charge. 75 Under the Stovall test, which had been developed by
the Court for confrontations occuring prior to the date of the Wade decision, 76
a per se due process violation exists if the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the confrontation indicate that it was "unnecessarily suggestive
and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification. 17 7 Under the test, once
the conduct of the procedure is found to be unnecessarily suggestive, no
further evaluation of the actual reliability of the resulting identification is
required. 78 The due process clause forbids the procedure79 and hence evi-
dence derived from the unconstitutional confrontation is inadmissible.80 This
test furthers the two major objectives of due process: it ensures the fairness of
the proceeding involved81 and, by eliminating the suggestiveness, it increases
the likelihood of the reliability of the evidence obtained.8 2
The protections envisioned by Kirby, however, have not resulted. For one,
the protection accorded by the Stovall due process standard has eroded since
the Kirby decision.8 3 Notwithstanding this erosion, it is submitted that due
75. 406 U.S. at 690-91.
76. 388 U.S. at 296, 301-02; see notes 42-48 supra and accompanying text.
77. 388 U.S. at 302.
78. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 301-02 ("violation of due process of law [occurs) in the
conduct of a confrontation' (emphasis added); see Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 120-22
(1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 691.
80. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196
(1972); United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 405-08 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1016 (1975). In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), the test which Stovall had
applied to testimony about the pretrial identification was modified by the Court for in-court
identifications based on allegedly suggestive pretrial identifications. The Simmons test asked
whether the pretrial identification was "so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Id. at 384. This shift in focus from
suggestiveness to reliability of evidence is consistent with the Wade Court's rationale in applying
the independent basis test to in-court identifications. See note 32 supra.
81. Due process assures that the proceedings are not obnoxious to a sense of "decency and
fairness." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952); accord, United States v. Lovasco, 431
U.S. 783, 790 (1977); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526 (1973); see Kanisar, The Right
to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on 'The Most Pervasive Right" of an
Accused, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1962).
82. See, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,
320 (1959); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
83. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 118 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Grano, Kirby,
Biggers and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remazin Against the Danger of€Convicting the
Innocent?, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 717, 719 (1974). Five major due process cases have been decided
since Stovall. In the two cases decided since Kirby, no due process violations were found.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), discussed at notes 96-105 infra and accompanying
text; Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), discussed at notes 85-93 infra and accompanying text.
In the three cases decided before Kirby, all of which involved confrontations before the date of
the Stovall decision, the Court found only one due process violation. Coleman v. Alabama, 399
U.S. 1 (1970) (no denial of due process); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969) (due process
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process is inferior to the assistance of counsel as a safeguard of the defendant's
rights. 84
A. The Erosion of Due Process
The erosion of the Stovall/Kirby test began in Neil v. Biggers. 85 In that
case, the victim of a rape identified the defendant in a showup at which the
defendant was flanked by two policemen and was required to speak the words
of the assailant.86 Despite the inherent suggestiveness 87 and lack of necessity"8
of a showup conducted in this manner, the Court did not find that due process
had been violated.8 9 The Court reached this result by modifying the Stovall
test to provide that so long as the reliability of an identification can be shown,
no due process violation will be found regardless of the procedure's unneces-
sary suggestiveness. 90 When applying its test to the facts in Biggers, the Court
found the identification evidence reliable because of the witness' certainty
about her identification, her chance to view the accused during the crime, her
accuracy in previously describing her assailant, and her failure previously to
identify a suspect.9 1
As rationale for its modification, the Biggers Court stated that the Stovall
per se exclusionary rule was intended to deter the use of suggestive procedures
by law enforcement officials. 92 Accordingly, the Biggers Court reasoned that
violation); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (no denial of due process). In Moore v.
Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977), a case decided under the sixth amendment, the Court indicated in
dictum that the suggestiveness of the identification procedure at the defendant's preliminary
hearing violated due process. Id. at 229-30. The procedure was suggestive since the witness was
told she was going to see her assailant, she viewed the suspect as he stood in court, and she heard
the charges and evidence recited before she made her identification. Id.
84. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309-13 (1973); id. at 338-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 696-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
86. Id. at 195.
87. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967); P. Wall, supra note 29, at 27-28, 40-41;
Williams & Hammelmann, supra note 29, at 486. It has been argued that a showup is a per se
due process violation in the absence of exigent circumstances. Wright v. United States, 404 F.2d
1256, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Bazelon, J., dissenting); Note, Due Process Considerations in Police
Showup Practices, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 377, 384 (1969).
88. The Court agreed with the finding of the lower courts that the police did not make an
exhaustive attempt to organize a lineup. 409 U.S. at 199.
89. The court of appeals had found that the confrontation procedure was unduly suggestive
and the evidence unreliable. Biggers v. Neil, 448 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1971).
90. 409 U.S. at 199. Indicia of reliability are similar to the factors of the independent basis
test discussed at note 32 supra. They include: (1) how well and how long the witness viewed the
suspect; (2) how accurate the witness' oral description of the suspect was; (3) the witness' certainty
about the identification; (4) the time lapse between the crime and the confrontation; and (5) the
witness' awareness of the criminal during commission of the crime. Id. at 199-200.
91. Id. at 200-01. The Court reasoned that the witness' previous failure to identify a suspect
established a "record for reliability" which outweighed the lapse of seven months between crime
and identification. Id. at 201.
92. The Biggers Court said that the Stovall test was aimed at preventing unjustified
utilization of a less reliable procedure. 409 U.S. at 199; ef. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263,
273 (1967) (more important to deter objectionable police conduct than to admit relevant
evidence).
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since the confrontation in that case occurred before the date of the Stovall
decision, when law enforcement officials were first informed that evidence
derived from such procedures was per se inadmissible, the application of the
Stovall exclusionary rule in Biggers would serve no deterrent purpose. 93 This
analysis, however, misinterprets the intention of the Court in Kirby and
Stovall. In those decisions, the Court was less interested in deterring police
conduct than in ensuring that the procedure in issue was fundamentally fair.94
Because unnecessarily suggestive procedures are inherently unfair to the
defendant, the Court in those two decisions concluded that the due process
clause prohibits such confrontations.9"
The erosion of the StovalllKirby test continued in Manson v. Brathwaite,96
when the Supreme Court extended the Biggers test to confrontations occurring
after the date of the Stovall decision. In Manson, the identifying witness, an
undercover policeman, allegedly stood two feet away from the defendant
during a drug buy. 97 After the sale, the undercover policeman described the
seller in detail to another officer.98 The latter officer left a photograph of the
defendant, who fit this description, with the undercover agent. Two days
later the undercover policeman identified the person in the photograph as the
seller.99 At the trial, the undercover agent testified about his initial photo-
graphic identification and made an in-court identification of the defendant. ' 00
On the basis of this testimony, the defendant was convicted.
Applying the Biggers test to the identification, the Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction, 0 1 holding that although a lineup or photographic array could
have been used instead of the concededly more suggestive single-photo
identification, 10 2 due process was satisfied because the evidence was
93. 409 U.S. at 199; see United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 405-09 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975).
94. An examination of Stovall shows that it was divided into two major sections, one on
retroactivity of the Wade decision, 388 U.S. at 296-301, and the other on due process. Id. at
301-02. Although the Court found deterrence to be a major factor in determining that Wade
would not have retroactive effect, the Court did not mention deterrence as a factor in its
discussion of due process.
95. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 691; Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 301-02; see notes 75-82
supra and accompanying text.
96. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
97. Id. at 100.
98. Id. at 101.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 102.
101. The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit which had held that under the Stovall
test the identification testimony should have been excluded, regardless of reliability, because the
testimony was the direct result of an unnecessarily suggestive procedure. Brathwaite v. Mianson,
527 F.2d 363, 367, 371 (2d Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit reasoned that the Biggers modification
of the Stovall test was limited to pre-Stovall identifications and that the S tovall test was still
viable for confrontations held after that date. Id. at 369-71; accord, Rudd v. Florida, 477 F.2d
805, 809 (5th Cir. 1973); Smith v. Coiner, 473 F.2d 877, 880-81 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1115 (1973); Workman v. Cardwell, 471 F.2d 909, 910 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932
(1973). In any event, the court found the evidence unreliable. 527 F.2d at 371.
102. 432 U.S. at 102, 109. The prosecutor failed to explain why a less suggestive procedure
was not used. Id.
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sufficiently reliable. 10 3 The indicia of reliability included the training of the
eyewitness as a police officer, his opportunity to view the suspect in a lighted
hallway, and his certainty about the identification. 10 4
The application of the Biggers modified test would seem inapposite to the
Manson situation. In Manson, both the identification and trial took place
after the date of the Stovall decision. Therefore, unlike the police in Biggers,
the law enforcement officials in Manson were forewarned of the consequences
of conducting suggestive procedures. As a result, the deterrent effect of the
Stovall test could have been realized in Manson. 0 5
As a consequence of the modification in Biggers and Manson, the due process
interest in a defendant's right to fair play has been eroded. Stovall protected
the due process interests in both fairness and reliability by looking no further
than the conduct of the corporeal identification procedure. A suggestive
procedure constitutes a per se due process violation because suggestiveness is
obnoxious to notions of fair play and raises a substantial likelihood that the
evidence is unreliable. On the other hand, Biggers and Manson, by looking
only at the resulting identification, protect the interest in reliability at the
expense of the concern with fundamental fairness. Under the modified ap-
proach, due process is violated only when the identification is unreliable. A
suggestive procedure is merely one factor in determining reliability and is no
longer determinative as to admissibility. 10 6 In Biggers and Manson, the Court
shifted the focus from fairness to reliability because it reasoned that withhold-
ing relevant evidence from the trier of fact's consideration would be too high a
cost for society to pay. 10 7 But the Court ignored the fundamental unfairness
of subjecting a defendant to a suggestive procedure which, in effect, raises an
inference of guilt before guilt has been proven. 108 Moreover, this reasoning
eschews the disrespect for law enforcement occasioned by less than cir-
cumspect police behavior.' 0 9
103. Id. at 117. The dissent agreed with the Second Circuit's conclusion that tile totality of
the circumstances indicated the evidence's unreliability. Id. at 129-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 114-16.
105. The Manson Court recognized the factual distinction between Manson and Biggers, 432
U.S. at 106-07; id. at 124-25 (Marshall, J., dissenting), but nevertheless concluded that "reliabil-
ity is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony for both pre- and
post-Stovall confrontations." Id. at 114.
106. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 110, 113-14; see notes 87-90 supra and accompany-
ing text. The Manson Court stated that "the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification
itself" is to be weighted along with the indicia of reliability. Id. at 114. Most authorities adhere to
the contrary view that unnecessary suggestiveness should result in exclusion. See, e.g., Smith v.
Coiner, 473 F.2d 877,881-82 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1115 (1973); Grano, supra note 83,
at 782-83; ALI, A Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure §§ 160.1, .2 (1975); 73 Colum. L.
Rev. 1168, 1180 (1973).
107. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112-13; see United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges,
510 F.2d 397, 405-07 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975); Clemons v. United States,
408 F.2d 1230, 1250-52 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Leventhal, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 964
(1969).
108. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 128-29 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (the
Manson test imports "the question of guilt into the initial determination of whether there was a
constitutional violation [which] undermines the protection afforded by the Due Process Clause');
Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899); Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199, 202 (1966).
109. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 127 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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B. Due Process Versus the Right to Counsel
Notwithstanding its erosion, the Stovall due process protection is an
inadequate substitute for the presence of counsel. The protections accorded by
due process and the right to counsel are not coextensive. In addition to
protecting the due process interests in reliability and fairness, the numerous
functions of counsel ensure that the defendant will be able to exercise any
other rights he might have,"10 including his right to confrontation and
meaningful cross-examination,"' his right to be convicted only on evidence
independently gathered and proven by the prosecutor,'" 2 and his right to the
necessary tools for his defense.'13
Perhaps the most important function of counsel at the early stages of the
proceedings is to ensure his own effectiveness at the trial itself. 4 Because of
his knowledge of substantive and procedural law, counsel is able to discover
illegal conduct of the police and prosecutor which, because of its subtlety, is
imperceptible to the untrained layman."15 Moreover, counsel is able to
ascertain the state's strategy in the case. 116 This information is necessary to
preserve the right to cross-examine and confront witnesses because, without
observing 1 7 what might be illegal activity, counsel's challenge to either the
admissibility or credibility of evidence introduced at trial would be unin-
formed, based on conjecture and hearsay."18 Counsel's presence avoids the
serious difficulties that are encountered under a due process standard in
reconstructing what transpired at the procedure." 19
110. Schaefer, supra note 13, at 8; see notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
111. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227, 235 (1967).
112. See id. at 238; cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447 (1966) (allowing use of
confessions elicited during custodial interrogations in absence of counsel makes law enforcement
officials less diligent in finding independent evidence).
113. One report concluded that proceeding without counsel resulted in denying the accused
"access to the tools of contest [which] is offensive... [and] detrimental to the proper functioning
of the [adversary] system of justice. . . . [Tlhe loss in vitality of the adversary system, thereby
occasioned, significantly endangers the basic interests of a free community." Attorney General's
Comm. on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice, Report 11 (1903).
114. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932);
see notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
115. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); see Schaefer, supra note 13, at 8.
116. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); Schaefer, supra note 13. at 8.
1 f7. By being present, counsel subjects himself to the possibility of later being called to testify
about the questionable procedure, resulting in a conflict of interest. If so, the attorney may be
forced to withdraw as defense counsel. See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 5-9 to
-10, DR 5-102A (1973); State v. Blake, 157 Conn. 99, 102, 249 A.2d 232, 234 (1968) (if called as a
witness, counsel should withdraw as defendant's attorney). One possible solution would be to use
substitute counsel at the confrontation. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 & n.27 (1967),
see Zamora v. Guam, 394 F.2d 815, 816 (9th Cir. 1968) (approving use of substitute counsel);
People v. Morrow, 276 Cal. App.2d 700, 703, 81 Cal. Rptr. 201, 203 (1969) (outside counsel may
testify about the fairness of the identification). Another solution would be for counsel to bring
another person with him to the lineup. This person could then testify at the trial if the need
arises.
118. At least one commentator has gone so far as to conclude that if investigation for trial
relies solely on the knowledge of the defendant, even the most exacting cross-examination would
not elicit information that would be revealed by a more thorough investigation conducted by the
attorney. Kamisar, supra note 81, at 60-61.
119. As the Wade Court observed: "[T]here is serious difficulty in depicting what transpires at
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Unlike due process, the assistance of counsel provides a balancing force to
the police and prosecutor1 20 at the pretrial procedure. In contrast to law
enforcement officials, who are familiar with criminal procedure, "the idiosyn-
crasies of juries," and personnel of both the police department and the
courts,1 21 the accused is usually an inexperienced layman. As such, the
accused needs counsel to ensure an effective assertion of his pretrial
procedural and substantive rights 122 which would be accorded dubious
protection if "entrust[ed] to the discretion of those whose job is the detection
of crime and the arrest of criminals. 1' 23 Thus, if counsel were present, he
could ensure that a defendant asserts his right to an early appearance before a
magistrate, 124 to contest probable cause for arrest, to secure release on bail, or
to undergo an early psychiatric examination. 125
In contrast to due process, the presence of an attorney in pretrial stages can
prevent the occurrence of abuse. 126 Assuming that an innocent suspect is the
subject of a potentially suggestive confrontation, his attorney can suggest a
change of procedure which may result in the nonidentification and exonera-
tion of the defendant.' 2 7 If an attorney is not present at the procedure and the
suspect is mistakenly identified, the identification will frequently be sufficient
grounds for a subsequent trial' 28 Because of the unnecessary suggestiveness of
the procedure, the evidence will probably be excluded at trial under the
Stovall test. 129 Thus, the same result will most likely ensue-the defendant
will be set free-but the individual's fundamental right to fairness will have
been accorded less protection by due process. He will have been unnecessarily
subjected to a deprivation of liberty 130 and the pain and expense of trial.
[secret confrontations]" since the names of the participants are rarely divulged, and neither the
eyewitness, the participants, nor the suspect are apt to be alert to the surrounding conditions. 388
U.S. at 230-31.
120. A prosecutor's role before judicial criminal proceedings includes the power to decide
whether to bring the case before a grand jury for indictment and whether the evidence Is strong
enough to bring the case to trial. See B. Forst, J. Lucianovic & S. Cox, supra note 41, at 15,
61-64, 66-68.
121. F. Heller, The Sixth Amendment 20-21 (1969).
122. See Geders v. 'United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88 (1976); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
462-63 (1938).
123. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
124. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a) provides that a suspect is to be brought before a magistrate
without "unnecessary delay."
125. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970); see Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel
in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal Policy Observations, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 41 &
n.175 (1963).
126. The Wade Court noted that counsel's presence is necessary to effectuate defendant's
"first line of defense [which is] the prevention of unfairness and the lessening of the hazards of
eyewitness identification at the lineup itself." 388 U.S. at 235 (emphasis added).
127. See note 141 infra and accompanying text.
128. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967); Williams & Hammelmann, supra
note 29, at 482. See generally Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The
Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1079 (1973).
129. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967). It is difficult to predict the result under
the Stovall test. That test has been characterized as unpredictable and "amorphous at best and
capricious at worst." The Pretrial Right, supra note 3, at 418-19 n. 108; see The Supreme Court,
1966 Term, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 112, 179 (1967).
130. One commentator has indicated that the holding of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
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Finally, the sixth amendment right to counsel provides a more certain
standard for law enforcement officials to follow than does due process.' 3 1 Due
process is a retrospective test which involves a case-by-case approach turning
on such factors as the completeness and clarity of the record on appeal. ' 32 It
does not and cannot give the states, the federal government, or judges
permanent constitutional standards with which to comply. 133 On the other
hand, a standard that mandates the appointment or retention of counsel for
the accused provides adequate forewarning to all parties of the consequences
of a violation and removes the uncertainty that now accompanies conduct
occurring before the Kirby standard attaches. 134
In any event, the presence of counsel may also benefit the government.
When counsel actively advises on the methods employed, he indirectly
provides a better identification procedure. 13s Thus, more efficient utilization
of the investigatory and enforcement resources of the government results.
Indeed, one commentator contends that better identification procedures lead
to higher conviction rates. 136
An examination of two cases in which the Court applied the Stovall test
prior to its erosion illustrates the more adequate protection accorded the
defendant when counsel is present. First, in Foster v. California, ' 37 the police
had the defendant participate in three identifications before the same witness,
the victim of a robbery. The witness was unable to identify the defendant at
either of the first two procedures, a lineup and a showup. In the second
(1972), that no person may be imprisoned for any offense unless represented by counsel, may
mean that a defendant cannot be detained before trial on the basis of evidence obtained in the
absence of his attorney. See Mandate, supra note 16, at 6.
131. Under a sixth amendment standard, the police would know that if counsel were not
present, evidence about a pretrial identification would be automatically excluded and evidence
about an in-court identification would be excluded unless an independent basis were shown.
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1967). On the other hand, the due process test is
decided on a case-by-case basis, often with conflicting results. United States ex rel. Kirby v.
Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 407 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975). Compare Mianson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114-17 (1977) with Brathwaite v. Manson, 527 F.2d 363, 371-72 (2d
Cir. 1975). Compare Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230, 1238-50 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 964 (1969) with id. at 1252-57 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
132. One commentary has argued that in the absence of counsel at the pretrial identification,
it is nearly impossible to show a due process violation since the claim has to rest on the
defendant's observations. The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 112, 179 (1967); cf.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 230 (1967) (practical impossibility of reconstructing what
transpired at the confrontation).
133. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110 (1977).
134. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299 (1967).
135. "[C]ounsel can hardly impede legitimate law enforcement; on the contrary . . . law
enforcement may be assisted by preventing the infiltration of taint in the prosecution's identifica-
tion evidence. That result cannot help the guilty avoid conviction but can only help assure that
the right man has been brought to justice." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 238 (1967)
(footnotes omitted).
136. McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal Identifications, 12 Wm. & Lary
L. Rev. 235, 241 (1970).
137. 394 U.S. 440 (1969). The Court applied the Stovall test because the Foster confronta-
tions occurred before the date of the Wade decision. Foster is the only case in which a due process
violation has been found to date. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
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lineup, at which the defendant was the only one who had also participated in
the first lineup, the victim finally identified the defendant. 138 Defendant was
tried and convicted on the basis of this identification evidence. On appeal, the
Court found a denial of due process under Stovall because of the egregiously
suggestive police behavior which "[i]n effect . . . said to the witness, 'This is
the man.'"'1 39
Had counsel been appointed for the pretrial procedure, it is likely that both
the due process violations and the trial could have been avoided. The first
lineup was suggestive because of the defendant's disproportionate height as
well as the fact that he alone wore the clothes the thief allegedly wore. 1 40 This
due process violation could have been prevented if counsel had been present
and had requested that the lineup be conducted with participants bearing a
closer physical resemblance to the defendant. 141 Following the victim's failure
to make an identification at the first lineup, 'the police then staged a showup,
an inherently more suggestive procedure than a lineup.142 Because there were
no exigent circumstances justifying the use of' the latter, 143 the attorney might
have successfully demanded that a lineup be used instead. After the victim's
failure to identify defendant a second time, the attorney might have been able
to secure the defendant's release. Instead, in the absence of counsel, the
defendant was subjected to a third procedure at which he was finally
identified by the victim. 144 Thus, although the result would have been the
same if the accused had had the assistance of counsel-exoneration-such
assistance might have prevented the deprivation of liberty and the agony of a
trial. The due process standard gave only retrospective relief.
The second case, Coleman v. Alabama, 1.,5 involved a pretrial lineup in
which only the defendant 14 6 wore a hat similar to the one worn by the
assailant and, although the record was inconsistent on the issue, in which only
some of the participants in the lineup were required to speak the assailant's
138. 394 U.S. at 441-42.
139. Id. at 443.
140. Id. at 442-43.
141. Such suggestions comport with the Wade guidelines, which allowed counsel an active
role. 388 U.S. at 224-38. The dissent interpreted Wade as giving counsel a managerial role. Id. at
255 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court in United States v. Ash, 413
U.S. 300, 312 (1973), stated that the function of an attorney at an identification procedure was
similar to that of the advocate at trial. See Model Rules, supra note 63, R. 409, Comments B-C.
In jurisdictions that assign an active role to counsel, his silence may act as a waiver of
objectionable lineup procedures. 1 B. George, Criminal Procedure Sourcebook 461 (1976).
However, most codes regulating the lawyer's role at identification procedures envision a passive
role. E.g., ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 428-30 (1975); Model Rules, supra note
63, R. 409 & Comment A; accord, Read, supra note 37; Uviller, The Role of the Defense Lawyer
at a Line-Up in Light of the Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall Decisions, 4 Crim. L. Bull. 273 (1968).
142. See note 29 supra.
143. Since a lineup had already been held, and since one was to follow, neither time nor lack
of participants appear to have been a problem. It would seem that the only reason the showup
was held was to obtain a conclusive identification. See Foster v. California, 394 U.S. at 443.
144. Id.
145. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
146. Although the case actually involved the appeals of two of the three defendants, only
defendant Coleman's claims will be discussed.
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words. 147 The Court did not find undue suggestiveness, 4 8 reasoning that the
record indicated that the victim's identification was made before the defen-
dant spoke and after the defendant's hat was removed. 149
On the basis of the Court's factual assumptions,' 5" the holding was correct
under a due process analysis because under the totality of the circumstances
the procedure itself was not unnecessarily suggestive. Nevertheless, the case
illustrates the importance of early assistance of counsel to enable effective
reconstruction and cross-examination.' s ' An attorney's presence might have
resolved the conflict about whether the suspects were the only ones required
to speak and whether they spoke before the identification was made. As it
was, the Court had to rely on the victim's recollections. 's In cross-examining
the witness, the attorney also had to rely on the victim's version. Thus,
because reconstruction was impossible, the due process claim, essentially a
factual claim, had to be based on unresolved facts. IS3
These two cases demonstrate that even a strictly applied Stovall standard
would not be an adequate substitute for counsel in confrontations held before
the initiation of "adversary judicial proceedings." Due process cannot accom-
plish the same goals that counsel can. Counsel can potentially prevent the
inherent dangers of suggestion and the likelihood of misidentification, whereas
due process protections only have retrospective application.' 5 4 Counsel also
enables effective reconstruction of the pretrial corporeal identification, pre-
serving the defendant's basic rights to cross-examine and confront the wit-
nesses against him, which is a practical impossibility under the due process
standard.' s5 Moreover, counsel provides the tools needed to maintain the
system as an adversarial one, whereas under the due process standards, the
accused is left to stand alone against his opponents.- 6 In sum, the substitu-
147. 399 U.S. at 5-6. The detective testified that all the participants spoke; the eyewitness
testified that only some of the participants spoke; and the defendant testified that only he and his
co-defendants spoke. Id. at 6.
148. Although the Court affirmed the lower court's finding that there was no denial of due
process, it reversed the conviction because the accused was not represented by counsel at the
preliminary hearing. Id. at 9-11; see notes 5 1-53 supra and accompanying text. In deciding the
due process issue, the Court applied the Stcvall test as modified by Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968), discussed at note 80supra, because the issue was the admissibility of an
in-court identification rather than testimony about the pre-trial identification itelf.
149. 399 U.S. at 5-6.
150. The Court was unsure whether only the defendants were required to speak and it
assumed from the silent record that the defendant was not forced to wear the hat. Id. Moreover,
because the record was silent, the Court assumed that the police did nothing to prompt the
identification. Id.
151. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 230 (1967); notes 117-19 supra and accom-
panying text.
152. 399 U.S. at 5-6.
153. Had counsel been present, these points might have been clarified. See The Supreme
Court, 1966 Term, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 112, 178-79 (1967); The Pretrial Right, supra note 3, at 420
n. 108.
154. See notes 126-30 supra and accompanying text.
155. See notes 114-19 supra and accompanying text.
156. See notes 120-25 supra and accompanying text.
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tion of due process for the right to counsel has merely widened the gap
between the rights afforded a defendant before and after formal charge.
III. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL ACCOMPANYING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
VERSUS THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The explicit sixth amendment right to counsel is guaranteed to defendants
in "all criminal prosecutions.' 1 7 According to Kirby, this right attaches at or
after the commencement of judicial criminal proceedings.'" 8 In contrast, the
fifth amendment- 5 9 mandates the assistance of counsel at pretrial police
interrogations as a means of protecting the privilege against self-in-
crimination. 160 This right attaches as soon as "a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way,"'16 that is, at arrest, which frequently occurs before the initiation of
judicial criminal proceedings. This distinction seems unwarranted. The fifth
amendment and the sixth amendment rights to counsel protect substantially
the same interests: reliability of evidence, the integrity of the individual, and
the integrity of the adversary system. Counsel is essential to protect these
interests, not only in the context of the custodial interrogations protected by
the fifth amendment, but in all other pretrial procedures within the potential
scope of the sixth amendment as well. 162 Accordingly, it is contended that the
right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment should attach at the same
time as the right to counsel accompanying the fifth amendment.
The fifth amendment right to counsel originated in Miranda v. Arizona1
63
as a means of protecting the privilege against self-incrimination from over-
reaching by police and prosecutors. The privilege is intended to protect three
different but overlapping interests 64 expressing "the moral striving of the
community" and reflecting "our common conscience."' 65 The first interest, the
157. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
158. 406 U.S. at 689 (1972). One commentator asserts that, under the Kirby standard, the
sixth amendment right to counsel "has no life it can call its own" in the pre-judicial proceeding
situations, but is rather dependent on an interrogation situation. Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams,
Massiah and Miranda: What Is Interrogation? When Does It Matter?, 67 Geo. L.J. 1, 61 (1978).
159. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person ... shall be compelled In
any criminal case to be a witness against himself ...... U.S. Const. amend. V.
160. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
161. Id. at 444.
162. The pre-judicial proceeding corporeal identification is the pretrial procedure that would
be most appropriately protected by the sixth amendment right to counsel. Unlike fingerprinting,
the taking of handwriting exemplars, and photographing the accused, corporeal identifications
can be conducted in a variety of ways and there is little way to challenge effectively the results at
trial. See notes 56-61 supra and accompanying text. In contrast to photographic identification
procedures, corporeal identifications are conducted in the presence of the defendant, which raises
the "possibility . . . that [he] might be misled by his lack of familiarity with the law or
overpowered by his professional adversary." United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317 (1973),
163. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
164. See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 413-14 (1966); Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55, 56 & n.5 (1964).
165. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1964) (quoting E. Griswold, The Fifth Amendment
Today 73 (1955)). Dean Griswold further characterized the privilege against self-incrimination as
a keystone of civilization. E. Griswold, supra, at 7.
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reliability of evidence, 166 expresses the traditional Anglo-American distrust of
self-deprecatory statements.1 67 These statements, since they are often made
under psychologically or physically abusive treatment, 168 are inherently un-
trustworthy.16 9 This concern with trustworthiness is reflected by the pre-
Miranda standard used to determine whether a confession was voluntary and
therefore admissible. 170 Voluntariness was decided by examining the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether the accused was deprived of a "free
choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.1 171 If the confession was not
a product of free will, it was inadmissible because the "pressure of calamity"
and "the law of nature, which commands every man to endeavor his own
preservation" in the face of psychological or physical threats, lead to inherent
untrustworthiness. 172
The integrity of the individual, the second interest, is intended to secure
"respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life' ",173 by
166. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 447, 455 n.24, 470; Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S.
219, 236 (1941).
167. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). One commentator traced this
distrust to the Old Testament, wherein it was stated that a person could not be found guilty on
the basis of his own statements. Lamm, The Fifth Amendment and Its Equivalent in the
Halakhah, 5 Judaism 53, 55-56 (1956).
168. The Miranda Court enumerated many instances of physical abuse, such as burning the
suspect with cigarettes, focusing naked lights on the suspect, and beating the suspecL 384 U.S. at
446-47 & n.7. The Miranda Court was also concerned with mentally coercive tactics used by
police to elicit confessions. Id. at 448-54. Such techniques placed the suspect in an unfamiliar
environment and isolated him from family and friends, so that he was forced to rely on the
"fairness" and "friendship" of his police interrogators. Id.
169. Id. at 470; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959) (one reason for society's
abhorrence of coerced confessions is their "inherent untrustworthiness"); Lisenba v. California,
314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (the states prohibit use of involuntary confessions in order "to exclude
presumptively false evidence").
170. The voluntariness standard was enunciated in Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613
(1896), in which the Court stated that "the true test of admissibility is that the confession is made
freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort." Id. at 623. This test was
applicable for all confessions occurring before the date of the Miranda decision. See Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346 (1968) (per curiam); Clewis v.
Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967). The use of confessions obtained in the absence of the Miranda
procedural safeguards is still permitted to impeach the credibility of the defendant if he chooses to
take the stand. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (statement given after defendant requested a
lawyer and was told he must wait); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statement elicited in
violation of Miranda admissible for impeachment purposes to avoid giving the defendant license
to perjure). The statements, however, will be excluded for even this purpose if found to be
involuntary. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978).
171. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941); see Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
503, 513-15 (1963); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1944).
172. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 546-47 (1897) (quoting G. Gilbert, Evidence 140
(2d ed. 1760)). The Court reasoned that when faced with the possibility of physical or mental
abuse, the individual will endeavor to satisfy his interrogators by acknowledging as true anything
they assert. See id. at 547.
173. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (quoting United States v.
Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391
(1957)).
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prohibiting early common law practices that, in effect, required a person to
inform the government of his behavior and merely wait for punishment to be
doled out. 17 4 The interest focuses on the compulsion that often leads to
inhumane treatment1 7 and an infringement of the individual's right to
privacy. 176 By ensuring that the individual need not speak and that an
infringement of this right by overzealous law enforcement officials will not be
rewarded, 177 the privilege against self-incrimination seeks to prevent the
coercive tactics which subject a defendant to a choice of confession and
incrimination, perjury, or citation for contempt. 178
Reliability and integrity of the individual are both components of the third
interest, the integrity of the adversary system.179 This interest seeks to
maintain the American system of justice as an accusatorial, rather than an
inquisitorial one.' 80 The adversary system treats the defendant and the
174. At early common law, a person not yet formally accused of a specific crime was bound
under an oath ex officio of the ecclesiastical courts to answer all questions posed by the proper
official. A defendant who was formally accused was also required to answer all questions put to
him and the penalty for refusing to comply ranged from automatic conviction for treason and
misdemeanors to physical torture for felonys. See Morgan, The Privilege Against Sef-
Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 1-18 (1949).
175. The Miranda Court stated that the primary purpose of interrogation techniques was to
subjugate the defendant's will to that of his accuser, so that the defendant adopted the position
held by the police. 384 U.S. at 455. Exploiting the individual's psychological or physical
weakness is, without more, an infringement on individual liberty and the right to be left alone.
Id.; see Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966). The Court demonstrated
its concern with human dignity in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (192). In that case, a
doctor, at the direction of the police, pumped the suspect's stomach against his will and two
morphine capsules were recovered. Id. at 166. Notwithstanding the fact that the evidence
was reliable, the Court held that the methods employed violated due process for they "shock[edl
the conscience" and resembled "the rack and the screw." Id. at 172. The Court reasoned that the
situation was analogous to the use of coerced confessions and stated that "[u]se of involuntary
verbal confessions . . . is constitutionally obnoxious not only because of their unreliability. They
are inadmissible . . . even though statements contained in them may be independently established
as true. Coerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency." Id. at 173.
176. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 460; Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S.
406, 413-14 (1966); United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). See generally Beaney, The Constitutional Right to
Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 212.
177. The remedy for an invasion of the privilege against self-incrimination is exclusion of the
confession. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 479. The remedy was the same under the voluntary
test. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964). Moreover, evidence obtained as a direct
result of the unconstitutionally elicited confession must also be excluded. See Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). See generally Killough v. United States,
336 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
178. The choice between incrimination, prejury, or contempt has been characterized as a
"cruel trilemma." Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
179. See id.; In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 340-52 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting); Note, An
Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 Yale L.J. 1000,
1048-51 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Police Interrogation].
180. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). Malloy reasoned that the fifth amendment was
the "essential mainstay" of an adversary system. Id. In an inquisitorial system, on the other hand,
the prosecutor's evidence cannot be contradicted and the defendant is convicted on ex parte
affidavits. Furthermore, he is required to answer all questions put to him and may not be
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government as opponents and places the burden of proof on the government.
This burden mandates that the government convict the individual on the
basis of independent evidence and not on the basis of his own words. IsI The
self-incrimination privilege supports the adversary system by protecting soci-
ety's notion of fair play, which abhors coerced confessions,1 82 and by prevent-
ing fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence without regard to its truth
or falsity.' 83 Moreover, even if the government has borne its burden of
producing the evidence, respect for the privilege increases reliability.
The privilege against self-incrimination's concern with a fair adversary
proceeding is illustrated by the fact that the accused can refuse to answer only
if criminal prosecution may result. 1 84 Although the privilege attaches to most,
if not all, situations in which a person may have to give testimony tending to
be self-deprecatory, 8 s it is' not applicable if that person is granted immunity
from any prosecution that might be related to the utterances. '8 6 For example,
a person cannot be compelled to testify at a civil hearing or before the grand
jury if it is possible that a criminal prosecution will result, but he can be
compelled to testify if the government has guaranteed not to prosecute on the
matter in question. 187 The concern, therefore, is with the use of the self-
incriminating statement at a subsequent trial of the accused.
Prior to Miranda, these three interests were frequently thwarted by unlaw-
ful police behavior.' 8 8 Accordingly, in order to ensure that the privilege
permitted to introduce his own evidence. See W. Beaney, supra note 6, at 8-14; Police
Interrogation, supra note 179, at 1034-41; note 174 supra.
181. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964). The government must "shoulder the entire
load" during the "contest" of trial. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2251, at 317 (rev. ed. J.
McNaughton 1961).
182. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959). The adversary system is denigrated when
police use illegal methods to obtain evidence for trial. Id. Overzealousness in obtaining confes-
sions results in lack of enterprise on the part of law enforcement officials in obtaining indepen-
dent, constitutional evidence. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 447.
183. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236-37 (1941); see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 169 (1952).
184. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571-76 (1976); Counselman v. Hitch-
cock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892). The privilege can be invoked by a witness to protect himself from
criminal prosecution, not to protect others. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951). It
cannot be exercised merely to protect a general interest in privacy. United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 353 (1974). See generally Mayers, The Federal Witness' Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination: Constitutional or Common-Law? 4 Amer. J. Legal Hist- 107 (1960).
185. See Morgan, supra note 174, at 30-34 (legislative investigations).
186. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976). Immunity from a criminal
prosecution is the quid pro quo of requiring a person to speak. Ullmann v. United States, 350
U.S. 422, 439 (1956). In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), the Court struck down a
statute which required a witness subject to criminal prosecution to answer questions, reasoning
that only an absolute grant of immunity can supplant the constitutional privilege. Id. at 586.
187. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 575 (1976); Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892). For a discussion of the right to counsel in the grand jury room, see note
1 supra.
188. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (suspect interrogated for four hours
while standing and handcuffed); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (extreme physical
brutality used to extort confessions that provided sole basis for conviction). See generally
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against self-incrimination did "not become but a 'form of words' in the hands
of government officials," the Miranda Court mandated that a defendant was
entitled to retained or appointed counsel during custodial interrogations. 18 9 If
the defendant was uninformed or did not make a knowing and intelligent
waiver of this right, 190 the fifth amendment required the exclusion of any
exculpatory or inculpatory statements made by him at a custodial interroga-
tion. 191
The assistance of counsel provided by Miranda is designed to further the
three interests protected by the fifth amendment. First, when the defendant
speaks to his adversaries without counsel, the statements are often unreliable.
Counsel safeguards the interest in reliability by eliminating the characteristic
secrecy of the interrogation 192 and by lessening the accused's fear of his
accusers, resulting in fairer, more accurate statements. 193
Counsel is also needed to guarantee that the accused's statements are not
the product of coercion, thereby preserving the individual's integrity. Because
of the inherently coercive atmosphere of the custodial interrogation, 194 there is
no certainty that an unrepresented suspect knows that he could exercise his
right to remain silent without repercussion or that he is aware of the
consequences of speaking.19 Moreover, even if the accused is aware that he
has a right to remain silent, the coercive atmosphere of the interrogation
might overtake the defendant's will not to speak. 196 Clearly, the government
alone cannot be entrusted with the preservation of these rights of a defen-
dant. 197 Instead, an attorney's presence is needed to prevent actual physical
and mental brutality as well as to reduce the atmosphere of compulsion and
isolation.
Finally, counsel is needed at the early interrogation to protect the defen-
dant's rights at trial and to maintain a fair adversary system. If the accused does
decide to speak at an interrogation, and the Miranda requirements in no way
Sterling, Police Interrogation and the Psychology of Confession, 14 J. Pub. L. 25 (1965)
(documenting cases of police disregard of the defendant's right to remain silent).
189. 384 U.S. at 444 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920)). The accused must also be informed that he is entitled to exercise the fifth amendment
privilege; he must be told that the consequence of speaking is that his statement may be used at
trial against him; and he must be told that counsel will be appointed for him if he is indigent. Id.
190. Id. at 444-45, 475-76. Even if the suspect initially waives these rights, the interrogation
must be stopped at any time the suspect indicates a desire to speak to an attorney. Id. at 444-45.
191. See note 177 supra and accompanying text. Of course, a prosecutor would not want to
use statements which are in fact exculpatory. Statements intended by the defendant to be
exculpatory, however, may later be used to impeach the defendant's credibility at trial. Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 477. For example, in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the suspect
thought he was clearing himself when he told the police that someone else actually pulled the
trigger of the murder weapon. He did not know that the penalty for an accomplice is the same as
for the principal. Id. at 482-83.
192. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 448.
193. Id. at 470. See also Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 447-48 (1958) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
194. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 465, 468.
195. Id. at 467-69.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 444, 466.
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prohibit this, 198 the presence of an attorney guarantees that " 'the most
compelling possible evidence of guilt, a confession, [is not] obtained at the
unsupervised pleasure of the police.' "199 Counsel's advice and questioning in
areas left unexplored by the police enables the accused to give a full and
accurate statement. 200 Moreover, counsel can later see that the statement is
accurately reported at trial °.20 Thus, counsel's presence at the interrogation
encourages a probing examination of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation and the substance of the confession at trial, increasing the
likelihood that only constitutional evidence will be used as grounds for
conviction.
The interests that the sixth amendment right to counsel protects in the
context of pretrial police investigations are not dissimilar to the three interests
safeguarded by the right to counsel accompanying the fifth amendment. In the
Wade and Kirby decisions, the Court noted the danger of unreliable iden-
tifications caused by suggestive pretrial corporeal identifications. 0 2 This
danger is heightened when a suggestive procedure results in a mistaken
identification because the witness rarely retracts the identification at trial30 3
Counsel can prevent unreliability by, for example, making suggestions which
could at least point out the suggestive features of a pretrial identification
procedure and at best encourage the police to correct them. 20 4 If counsel takes
this active role, he can prevent undue attention from being directed at his
client by requesting that, within reason, all the participants look alike, speak
alike, and act alike. As covert and overt influences on the witness decrease,
the likelihood that the identification will be based on the witness' own
observations during the crime increases.
The second interest, the integrity of the individual, is disparaged when a
criminal defendant is unnecessarily incarcerated. An innocent man should not
be deprived of his liberty and subjected to the demeaning status of a prisoner.
Unnecessary incarceration results from suggestive procedures in which an
identification of a particular suspect is all but inevitable. For example, in
Wade, the Court noted that suggestiveness often derives from the frequency
with which the witness is accidentally, or even intentionally, shown the
suspect before the actual lineup. 205 In addition, the police's belief that they
198. Miranda merely established guidelines for the taking of confessions and did not deny the
accused the right to speak if the statement was a product of free will. Id. at 470.
199. Id. at 466 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
200. Once a statement has been given by the accused, the government will probably use it at
trial. If the statement is not complete, it will nevertheless carry substantial weight with the jury.
Id.
201. Id. at 470. The Court noted that if coercion is exercised at the interrogation despite the
lawyer's presence, the lawyer can testify to his observations in court. Id. But see note 117 supra.
202. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 690-91; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228-29. The
Wade Court enumerated instances of the suspect being pointed out to the eyewitness and
instances of great disparity in the physical appearance of the accused and the other participants.
Id. at 232-33 & nn.18-23; see People v. Caruso, 68 Cal.2d 183, 188, 436 P.2d 336, 340, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 336, 340 (1968).
203. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 229; Williams & Hammelmann, supra note 29, at
482.
204. See note 141 supra and accompanying text.
205. 388 U.S. at 233.
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have caught the criminal will often be communicated to the witness, thereby
pressuring him to make an identification. 20 1 i This influence on the witness
cannot be tolerated, since it may result in a situation in which the accused
may be held on the basis of contrived, rather than independent, evidence.
The interest in an individual's integrity is left inviolate only when he can face
his accusers without fear of being treated unfairly, with the confidence to
avoid a guilty appearance, and when he is not humiliated by being compelled
to act in a manner different from other participants.
Counsel can protect the integrity of the individual by preventing overreach-
ing and suggestive conduct of the police. 20 7 Because of the inherently sugges-
tive atmosphere of the identification procedure, the government alone cannot
make certain that the accused is treated fairly.208 The Wade Court pointed
out that the witness, the participants, and the accused himself cannot be
expected to observe or correct the suggestiveness-only counsel can.209 Coun-
sel would also prevent the abuse occasioned by delaying indictments and
arraignment so that the police can conduct the confrontation before the
presence of counsel is mandated in accordance with the Kirby holding. 2 10
Finally, the integrity of the adversary system is furthered because the sixth
amendment right to counsel safeguards defendant's other rights, such as
confrontation and cross-examination. 2 1 1 The right to confrontation goes un-
protected when the circumstances under which a corporeal identification is
made cannot be reconstructed at trial. 21 2 Just as the fifth amendment ensures
the integrity of the system by guaranteeing that the accused will be convicted
by the prosecution's own efforts, the right to counsel guarantees that "the
'evidence developed' against a defendant shall come from the witness stand...
where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right of confronta-
tion [and] of cross-examination .... ,,213 By leaving the defendant to stand
alone at the pretrial confrontation, he is denied effective confrontation and
probing cross-examination, mainstays of an adversary system. This gives the
prosecution an impermissible advantage and calls to mind the common law
206. Id. at 235; see Williams & Hammelmann, sulfra note 29, at 483.
207. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S 52, 55-56 & n.5 (1964).
208. The police often are the ones who, intentionally or otherwise, cause the suggestive
features. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 234-35. Justice Douglas once stated that it would be
unconscionable to entrust a defendant's rights to his opponents. McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
209. 388 U.S. at 230-31.
210. People v. Fowler, 1 Cal.3d 335, 344, 461 P.2d 043, 650, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 370 (1969).
In fact, some law enforcement guidebooks suggest that lineup arrangements be made prior to the
suspect's arrest to facilitate the holding of the lineup before formal charge. Model Rules, supra
note 63, R. 402.
211. Cross-examination has been characterized as a "matter of right" and "one of tile
safeguards essential to a fair trial." Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691, 692 (1931). One of
the early cases that discussed the right of confrontation zeasoned that a fact can only be proved
by witnesses whom a defendant can confront because "[l]he presumption of the Innocence of an
accused attends him throughout the trial and has relation to every fact that must be established in
order to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899).
212. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 230-32.
213. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965).
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practice, long since condemned, in which the accused was denied the right to
be heard in his defense because he did not have the chance to examine
witnesses fully. 214 The fundamental fairness of an adversarial trial is oc-
casioned only by effectively counterbalancing the government's power and
making it bear the burden of proof.
This counterbalancing is achieved when counsel personally observes the
identification procedure and the witness' identification. As a result of his
observations, counsel is able to decide whether to elicit from the eyewitness
the circumstances surrounding the pretrial identification in order to impeach
both the eyewitness' prior and in-court identification, and, if the attorney so
decides, which circumstances to question. If suggestion occurred despite the
attorney's presence, the lawyer can bring the alleged irregularities to the
court's attention. 215 Ensuring that the accused, through his attorney, has at
his disposal the same procedural and substantive knowledge21 6 that the
prosecutor has renders nugatory the fear of the Wade and Miranda majorities
that a trial and determination of guilt would occur at the pretrial event rather
than in the courtroom. 2 1 7
Because the interests of reliability, integrity of the individual, and integrity
of the adversary system are protected by both the fifth and sixth amendments,
the right to counsel under the two amendments should attach at the same
time. The majority in Wade concluded that
nothing decided or said in [Miranda] links the right to counsel only to protection of
Fifth Amendment rights. Rather [that decision] "no more than [reflects) a constitu-
tional principle established as long ago as Powell v. Alabama .... ." It is central to
that principle that. . . the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against
the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where
counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial. The security of
that right is .. . the aim of the right to counsel .... 218
It has been demonstrated that, without counsel, the accused may be convicted
by the use of untrustworthy evidence of a confession or a witness' identifica-
tion, and that an accused's integrity is threatened by the unsupervised exercise
of police investigatory tactics, whether by psychological and physical coercion
in the interrogation, or by manifest or latent suggestiveness at the identifica-
tion. As a result, the adversary trial is relegated to an inquisitorial process,
depriving the accused of his major tools of contest--confrontation and cross-
examination-and shifting the burden of the government to prove guilt to the
defendant to prove innocence. It is contended that only the assistance of
counsel at all pretrial investigatory procedures can adequately prevent this
result.
214. See notes 6, 174 supra and accompanying text. See generally In re Oliver, 333 U.S 257,
273 (1948).
215. But see note 117 supra.
216. Justice Schaefer has stated that criminal procedural and substantive law is designed for
the lawyer who is familiar with it and that if the accused is not represented by counsel, the rules
"become a source of entrapment" to him. Schaefer, supra note 13, at 8; see Kamisar, The Right to
Counsel & The Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue of "The Most Pervasive Right" of the
Accused, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1962).
217. See notes 36, 198-201 supra and accompanying text.
218. 388 U.S. at 226 (footnotes and citation omitted).
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Furthermore, there are no substantial countervailing considerations against
requiring the presence of counsel in all situations at the earlier time. Mandat-
ing the presence of an attorney will not forestall prompt identification. 219 A
lawyer cannot prevent his client's participation in a corporeal identification
procedure since the latter, as a noncommunicative procedure, does not invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination. 220 To require counsel to be present
when he can advise his client to thwart the police totally by remaining silent,
but to dispense with his presence at a procedure in which he can only observe
and advise, is an anomaly that the Court has yet to explain.
Finally, requiring counsel from the moment of arrest will not obstruct
a legitimate criminal investigation. Fear that counsel could "obstruct the
course of justice is contrary to the basic assumptions upon which [the] Court
has operated"2 21 in deciding the Miranda line of cases222 as well as the Wade
line of cases. If anything, the presence of counsel results in better law
enforcement; it not only prevents the use of tainted evidence but also lends
added credence and respectability to investigatory techniques. This in turn
protects the integrity of the individual and our system of justice by guarantee-
ing that the innocent avoid conviction and the guilty be brought to justice. 2 23
Karen Akst Schecter
219. Id. at 237.
220. See note 32 supra.
221. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 237-38.
222. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 480-81. See also Police Interrogation, supra note
179, at 1048-50.
223. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 238. It appears that the Court may be reassessing Its
Kirby doctrine. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), Justice Stewart, writing for the
majority, noted that "[w]hatever else it may mean, the right to counsel ... means at least that a
person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been
initiated against him." Id. at 398 (emphasis added). In Kirby, the Court stated absolutely that the
right to counsel did not attach before the commencement of formal adversary proceedings. The
language of the Court in Brewer seems to leave open the possibility that the sixth amendment
right attaches sooner.
